INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Administration requires that transport aircraft be "darnage tolerant." That is, they must be:
"evaluated to ensure that should seriousfatigue, corrosion, or accidental darnage occur within the operationallife ofthe airplane, the rernaining structure can withstand reasonable Ioads without failure or excessive structural deforrnation until the darnage is detected. " [1] This definition recognizes the importance of darnage detection. For fatigue cracking, the inspection program must be carefully considered. A quantified probability of crack detection is essential to the darnage tolerance analysis of aircraft.
Most inspections for fatigue cracks use visual methods. More advanced non-destructive evaluation (NDE) methods are usually reserved for locations where darnage is known to occur. Thus, it is crucial to quantify the in-service visual probability of crack detection (POD). Some studies [e.g., 2] simulate realistic inspection conditions with a set of known cracks and calculate POD from detection data generated by trained inspectors. An alternative approach is the inference of POD from crack dctection data in maintenance records. This processeither explicitly or implicitly calculates each crack's size when it was missed during previous inspections.
BACKGROUND
The use ofmaintenance data to infer POD has been used in two previous studies [3, 4] . Miller [3] analyzed visually detected cracks from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group's Significant Incident Reporting System (SIRS) database. Previous crack size was computed from a simple model and a set of assumed initial conditions. A set of detection and non-detection events was then generated. A survival analysis was used to estimate POD.
Another cstimate of probability of crack detection was made by the Volpe Center [ 4] using the FAA's Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) data on detected cracks on Boeing 737 fuselages. In that study, a scries of mechanistic models were constructed to estimate the "nominal" growth of fuselage skin cracks and generate detection and non-detection events. POD was estimated using the maximum likelihood method. This method was found tobe acceptably self-consistent.
In the present study, data was obtained from the Japanese National Aerospace Laboratory. The data consists of structural cracks found visually on Japanese Boeing 7 4 7 aircraft. The data is from inspections from January 1988 to October 1990.
CLASSICAL SURVIV AL MODELS
Survival ana1ysis is a quantitative statistical study of the "survival" of individuals in a statistical population. The quantity used to correlate the data is analogous to age. In survival analysis, the "survivor" or "reliability" function, R(x), is defined as the probability that the age at death of a randomly chosen member ofthe populationwill be greater than the value x. Thus, R(x) may be viewed as the fraction ofthe population still alive at age x.
The "hazard rate", h(x), defined as the rate of death (or failure) at age x conditional on survival to age x. When this is integrated, the hazard function, H(x), is obtained:
The hazard function is an increasing function which takes the value 0 at the start of life (i.e., at x = 0). It can be shown [5] that
(1) (2) Therefore, estimating the survivor function from a set of data involves first estimating the hazard function and then applying Equation 2. For example, after sorting the age at death data from youngest to oldest so that x, gives the age of the ith death, the Nelson method [ 5] estimates the hazard function as:
SUR VIV AL MODEL AS PREVIOUSL Y PROPOSED
Miller applied survival analysis to the problern of inferring probability of crack detection from maintenance data [3] . The analogy between crack detection and life and death processes is that a crack is "born" when it becomes detectable and "dies" when it is detected and repaired. Crack length is the measure of a crack's age. In the analogy, the survivor function describes those cracks which remain undetected.
Miller's data [3] consisted of detected cracks from several aircraft types. A full crack growth analysis of each component was not practical. All cracks were assumed to start with the same initial crack size on the date of manufacture. Crack growth was calculated using a simple Paris Law rule: (4) where N is a measure of quantity of loading (e.g., Ioad cycles or flight time), K1 is the stress intensity factor, and C and m are empirically determined constants. The dates of previous inspections and their estimated crack sizes ("non-detection events") were calculated by working backward from the detection date.
Miller indexed both detection and non-detection events by crack size. The contribution from each event to the estimated hazard function was determincd. These contributions using the Nelson method were the individual terms in the series summation in Equation 3. Miller chose to treat the non-detection events as censored data. That is, in a standard analysis, an individual who did not "die" before data taking was finished was indexed in the same way but "censored" by not including its contribution in the surnmation. The estimated hazard function at any point was assumed to be the surn of only those contributions up to that point associated with detection events. Therefore, the effect of calculating and indexing the non-detection events was to !essen the contribution of some detection events to the hazard function.
It was then asserted that, when non-detection events are treated this way, POD could be estimated as the difference between 1 and the survivor function:
Point values of the hazard function were estimated for each of the detection events. To facilitate the use of a Weibull curve fit in the survival analysis, a linear regression of the logarithm of the estimated hazard function versus the logarithm ofthe crack length was determined which resulted in a bestfit estimate ofthe hazard function of the form:
H(L)=(~r (6) POD was then estimated using the assertion in Equation 5 . Because the trend ofthe data pointswas significantly nonlinear in log-log space, the analysis was refmed by introducing a detection Iimit (minimum detectable crack size which was subtracted from the observed crack size before analysis), Lo, and censoring. The events associated with the largest detections were censored (i.e., converted to non-detection events) until the data met the requirement that 90% ofthe detection data points were within a 90% confidence interval.
Miller [3] gave no detailed description ofwhy the classical survival analysis, which describes cumulative life and death processes, when modified by the inclusion of non-detection events should yield a description of instantaneous probability of crack detection. The authors of the present paper have concerns about this assertion. Various attempts were made to reconstruct POD in hypothetical case studies where a POD function was assumed and detection and non-detection events were known exactly [6] . In each case, this method did not give reasonable estimates ofthe original POD function.
AN ALTERNATIVE SURVIVAL ANALYSIS
Traditional survival analysis can be used to infer POD from crack detection data without the generation of non-detection events. Two restrictive assumptions are required. First, all cracks are inspected at regular known intervals. Although this is often assumed, Miller [3] was able to account for variability in inspection interval in new aircraft fleets. Second, all cracks grow in exactly the same way. That is, it takes a unique amount of time to grow from any given crack size to another. Given the wide range of loading and geometry that affect crack growth in aircraft, this assumption may be questionable. The assumption that all cracks start out the same size is no Ionger necessary. The classical survival analysis is then straightforward. The survivor function describes the cumulative probability that a crack will not have been detected by the time it reaches a certain crack size. It must be assumed that the total "risk" ofbeing detected is not distributed in a continuous manner, but rather is concentrated at the inspections. With the assumed crack growth model, the size ofthe crack detected at inspection i, L,, can be used to compute its size one inspection period earlier, ~.1 • The value ofthe survivor function at L,.J can then be found. The instantaneous POD at the end of an inspection interval can be thought of as the fraction ofthose cracksthat started the interval that did not finish (i. e., were detected). Since R(L ... 1) is the fraction of cracks that were not detected as of the start of the inspection interval and R(LJ is the fraction of cracks that survived through the end of the inspection interval, POD is given by:
With this method, sensitivity to assumed inspection interval or growth constant can be quickly assessed.
OTHER ANAL YTICAL METHODS
An intuitive way to estimate the probability of detection is to divide the detection and non-detection events into a collection of nonoverlapping "bins" covering the full range of lengths and to estimate the probability for the range of lengths in each bin by the number of detection events in that bin divided by the total number of events in that bin. The ranges must be selected carefully. A "natural histogram" uses bins that meet two conditions: (a) the sequence ofPOD estimates is strictly increasing; (b) subdividing any interval into two subintervals results in a violation of condition (a). These conditions define a unique collection of bins.
Another approach for analyzing detection and non-detection data is the rnaximum likelihood method. A functional form ofPOD is assumed from which a "likelihood" (POD for detection, 1 -POD for non-detection) is assigned to each detection or non-detection event. The parameters in the functional form are adjusted to maximize the globallikelihood (the product ofthe likelihood for all events). Forthis application, the functional form of POD must identically approach zero for a crack size of zero.
ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE DATA
The Japanese database contained 531 visually detected cracks from Boeing 747 aircraft. A simple crack growth model based on Equation 4 was used. The growth rate was assumed to be proportional to the stress intensity factor raised to the fourth power. The stress intensity factor was assumed tobe directly proportional to the square root of the crack size. That is, no geometric corrections were calculated for the stress intensity factor. The crack growth rule can be written:
where C is a constant. Although C can theoretically be calculated from a knowledge of the material, loading, and geometry, it was most practical to estimate it from the available data. An initiallength of 0.050 inches was assumed for each crack. The analyses can be repeated using three different assumptions. The value for the crack growth constant "C" can be treated as a global constant, a constant within any group of cracks with similar geometric descriptors, or as different for each crack. Space does not permit sufficient discussion of each case, but the results were not substantially different. The third case ( each crack with its own constant) will be presented because of its similarity to previous work. The value of C was averaged across all cracks.
The aircraft age, N, was measured in flight hours rather than cycles because, unlike many aircraft models, the lengths of747 flights vary considerably. In fact, for the aircraft included in the Japanese database, the average flight length varied between 2 and 6 hours. The asymptotic value of the inspection interval for Boeing 747's was assumed tobe 2850 flight hours.
It was assumed that the crack detection distribution was a "snapshot" of a steady state that could be reproduced indefinitely into the past and future. If a steady state were not assumed, some censoring of data would be necessary to account for the effect ofpotential "sibling cracks" (cracks with the same size history) that were detected outside of the time frame of the sample.
As in Reference 3, the estimated hazard function calculated via the Nelson method was non-linear in log-log space, so similar refinements were introduced. Detection Iimit and maximum uncensored length were varied over a range ofvalues. Foreachtrial set ofvalues, the root mean square error was calculated for the linear regression of the logarithm of estimated hazard function versus logarithm of crack length. The set ofvalues with the minimum root mean square error was selected.
The alternative survival analysis also generated individual points of the hazard function which then had to be fit to a curve. Once again, the trend was nonlinear even on logarithmic axes. Good agreement was found over the range of interest when the individual points of the estimated hazard function were fit to a simple polynomial (in linear rather than logarithmic axes). That functional form was then used to calculate the survivor function which in turn was used to compute the estimated POD from Equation 7.
The maximum likelihood method was used to generate estimated POD curves from the detection and non-detection events. Two probability distribution functions were considered: a Weibull distribution of theform:
and a lognormal function of the form: (10) where <l> is the normal distribution function. The parameters A and B were varied to achieve the maximum likelihood. Figure 1 shows estimated POD curves generated using the various versions of the survival analysis. The natural histogram is shown for reference. The use of censoring and detection Iimits provides only limited improvement in the way POD estimates track the behavior of point estimates. Even these refined curves do not compare well with the ranges suggested by the natural histogram. When the alternative survival analysis was used, the estimated POD falls within the range expected from the natural histogram only up to about 0.4 inches. For !arger crack sizes, this version ofthe survival method also significantly underestimates the POD.
RESUL TS AND DISCUSSION
Although the natural histogram method is the least computationally intensive of the approaches used, it may provide a more sound estimate ofPOD. As long as the quantity of data is sufficient and each binissmall enough that POD does not vary significantly across its width, the values ofthe histogram should be within experimental noise ofthe appropriate Ievel. Unfortunately, the relatively few detection and nondetection events at !arge crack sizes yield !arge jumps in the histogram. The !arge bins result from erack lengths reported to few significant figures. For example, 265 ofthe cracks were reported as either 0.25, 0.5, or 1.0 inches in length. Thus, detection and non-detection events congregate at a limited number of crack sizes which, in turn, affects the ranges of the natural histogram bins. Figure 2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates ofPOD obtained using the Weibull and lognormal functional forms. The natural histogram is shown for reference. The estimated POD curves generally match the natural histograms. For shorter crack lengths (less than about 0.6 inches), the Weibull functional form agreed better with the natural histogram and predicted lower POD. The maximum likelihood method and the natural histogram method agree well for any consistent set of detection and nondetection events. Thus, if an analysis satisfactorily resolves the data into detection and non-detection events, the maximum likelihood method should generate a good fit to the data. Figure 3 contains examples of estimated POD using each method applied in the present paper. For consistency, all curve fits assume the Weibull functional form. Also included in the figure are the POD curves generated in the previous studies using 1) the same survival analysis but a different data set [3] , 2) the maximum likelihood method with a different data set and a different method for generating non-detection events [4] , and 3) essentially the same (Japanese) data but the maximum likelihood method and a different assumed initial crack size [7] . Important trends can be observed. First, both variants ofthe survival method produced more conservative values ofPOD. This serves the purpose ofperforming a conservative darnage tolerance analysis, but may not be appropriate when attempting to verify and validate POD laboratory experiments. For the same data, the alternative survival method generated higher estimated POD for cracks less than about 0.5 inches and lower estimated POD for !arger cracks.
The difference between the two maximum likelihood analyses ofthe same (Japanese) data offers insight into the sensitivity of these methods to crack growth models and assumptions. In this case for example, the assumed initial crack size affected the results. Unless a better method for estimating crack size during previous inspections is developed, inferring POD from maintenance data can be used to generate a lower bound ofPOD if conservative assumptions are used. At present, it is also too sensitive to modeling approximations to produce an accurate estimate for comparison with laboratory results.
Another observation suggests a possible historical trend. The Japanese data produced a generally higher POD than the other data sets, regardless of the analysis method. The discrepancy results from significantly different crack detection distributions. For example, the median crack length in the data in Reference 3 was 1.5 inches while in the Japanese data it was 0.75 inches. It is unlikely that Japanese inspectors are as superior to others as might be inferred. A more probable explanation lies in the time frame ofthe data. Reference 3 uses data from the 1970's. Reference 4 uses data recorded between March 1985 and March 1992. The Japanese data was recorded between January 1988 and October 1990.
Although is possible that lighting and NDE technologies improved during the 1980s, resu1ting in more confirmations ofvisually detected cracks, another explanation relates to historical timing. The Aloha Airlines incident occurred in late April1988. The contribution ofwidespread fatigue darnage to the incident made airlines keenly aware of the importance of detecting small cracks. Until that point, more emphasis may have been placed on observing !arge cracks because !arge cracks grow relatively quickly and would have fewer opportunities to be detected before they threatened an aircraft' s structural integrity. The Aloha incident may have re-emphasized to inspectors the importance of detecting small cracks or possibly just the necessity of more carefully reporting them.
The Aloha incident occurred weil after the Reference 3 data, about halfway through the Reference 4 data, but near the beginning of the Japanese data. Figure 4 shows the average detected crack length for each month in the Japanese database. Figure 5 shows the number of cracks detected in the fleet for the same monthly data. In order to visualize trends more easily, six-month running averages (solid lines) were computed for these data. There is a great deal of month to month variation, some of which may be caused by variations in scheduled maintenance of, or even the size of, the Japanese 747 fleet. The trends indicate that average detected crack size started to fall in the second half of 1988. Simultaneously, average detections per month started to increase. lt is possible that inspectors were finding as many !arge cracks as ever, but were becoming more diligent in searching for and reporting small cracks.
The trends may have begun to revert to previous Ievels briefly in 1989 and more substantially in the second half of 1990, approximately two inspection intervals after the Aloha incident. Although it is possible that visual inspection POD has completely reverted to its pre-Aloha Ievel, another explanation isthat POD made a rapid and permanent shift in early 1988. If that were so, the variations during the two year period that followed could be the result of the disproportionate detection of marginally detectable small cracks. Those detections are the cracksthat would have been missed or unreported ifthe pre-Aloha POD were still dominant. Therefore, the short term changes in crack detection demographics during those two years would be the signature of a transition to a new steady state. Unfortunately, if such a scenario has taken place, it Jun-88 Dec-88 Jun-89 Dec-89 Jun-90 Dec-90 Figure 5 . Number of cracks detected by month in the Japanese database calls into question the validity of POD estimated using the crack detection data ofthat transition period. That is, it casts doubt upon POD estimates generated from any database ofthat period.
